🎙️ Copa Independent (World Cup 2026) September 23, 2026 ⏱️ 51 min

The United permacrisis - should it be this difficult?

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1. Executive Overview: Core Theses & Key Revelations

The latest edition of the Copa Independent podcast provides an unvarnished diagnosis of Manchester United’s ongoing operational and sporting malaise. Featuring insights from Lawrence Osler, Miguel Delaney, and Richard Jolly, the discussion moves beyond transient match-day frustrations to interrogate the structural flaws dismantling one of football’s traditional powerhouses. Sitting on five points after five Premier League fixtures, Manchester United presents a fascinating paradox to football analysts: a club generating respectable underlying statistical metrics in expected goals and penalty-area touches, yet exhibiting profound structural collapse, tactical incoherence, and individual anti-climax whenever placed under sustained elite competition.

The central thesis established during the panel’s evaluation is that Manchester United does not merely suffer from tactical errors or individual underperformance, but from a persistent, institutional permacrisis. This condition is characterized by chronic misalignment between executive recruitment, manager-specific squad construction, and on-pitch execution. The transition from Ruben Amorim’s specific three-back system to Michael Carrick’s hybrid structure has exacerbated existing friction, leaving a squad populated by high-value assets whose natural positional profiles overlap or directly undermine one another.

Furthermore, the discussion highlights three critical revelations regarding the club’s contemporary state:

  • The Identity Trap of Bruno Fernandes: For nearly a decade, the club’s identity has effectively devolved into the individual production of Bruno Fernandes. While his statistical output remains high, relying on a single high-usage playmaker without a cohesive collective framework has impeded the implementation of modern, controlled possession structures.
  • Recruitment Misalignment & Value Destruction: High-profile acquisitions—including Manuel Ugarte, Joshua Zirkzee, and André Santos—highlight a repeated failure in talent evaluation and profile matching. Midfield acquisitions in particular have struggled when exposed to structured opposition mid-blocks, often being outperformed by significantly lower-cost opponents.
  • Statistical Aberrations as Tactical Desperation: United’s Premier League-leading volume of 50 long-range shots is not an indicator of aggressive attacking intent, but rather an operational breakdown in central penetration, final-third coordination, and high-probability chance creation.

Ultimately, the panel demonstrates that without a coherent sporting vision that transcends individual managerial appointments, Manchester United will remain trapped in a cycle of temporary resets, tactical improvisation, and systemic stagnation.

2. Context & Background: The Landscape Leading to This Conversation

To understand the depth of Manchester United’s current crisis, one must evaluate the macro-environment of modern elite football alongside the club's specific structural trajectory over the last decade. Modern European football has undergone a tactical revolution defined by positional discipline, automated buildup phases, data-driven recruitment, and synchronized counter-pressing regimes. Teams like Manchester City, Arsenal, and elite continental outfits operate within strict, top-down game models where individual players function as specialized components within an overarching tactical philosophy.

In contrast, Manchester United’s modern history is defined by ideological volatility. Over an eight-year span, the club’s executive leadership has repeatedly pivoted between diametrically opposed coaching figures. Pragmatic low-block specialists have been succeeded by high-pressing theorists, who were subsequently replaced by possession-oriented tacticians, before pivoting again toward fluid reactive managers. Each transition has required substantial capital expenditure, resulting in a fractured squad composed of legacy players acquired under incompatible operational paradigms.

Operational Paradigm Tactical Archetype Squad Impact & Profile Mismatch
Low-Block Pragmatism Deep defensive line, direct vertical transitions Accumulation of direct runners and ball-carrying wingers lacking final-third patience.
High-Pressing / Transition Chaos Man-oriented pressing, high physical intensity Expenditure on hyper-aggressive ball-winners who struggle in sustained possession phases.
Positional Possession & 3-Back Systems Wing-backs, double-pivot control, central overload Signings tailored for specific wing-back and central-half roles left redundant upon system change.
Hybrid Pragmatism (Current) Flexible 4-2-3-1, reactive game-planning Positional congestion, over-reliance on individual brilliance, low-probability shooting.

The immediate backdrop to the podcast discussion is a highly troubling opening stretch to the season. Garnering just five points from five matches, United’s performances against Fulham, Hull City, Brighton, and Manchester City revealed deep-seated vulnerabilities. While Michael Carrick initially steadied the club as a reactive game-plan strategist, his transition to full-time management has reignited structural concerns. With a demanding upcoming schedule featuring Tottenham Hotspur alongside away trips to Atletico Madrid, Leeds United, and Como, the margins for tactical improvisation have vanished.

3. Deep-Dive Thematic Breakdown

3.1 Spatial Friction and Tactical Congestion in Zone 14

A primary tactical defect identified in Manchester United’s attacking mechanics is the spatial congestion occurring in central half-spaces and Zone 14—the critical region directly outside the opponent's 18-yard box. The summer acquisition of Matheus Cunha was intended to add dynamic ball-carrying and final-third incision. However, Cunha’s natural inclination is to operate in the exact spatial pockets prioritized by Bruno Fernandes.

Both players thrive when granted freedom to roam, dictate tempo, and attempt high-risk progressive passes. In a well-structured modern attack, positional rotation is governed by strict spatial balance: if one playmaker occupies the central channel, the other must stretch the pitch vertically or provide width in the half-spaces. Under United's current setup, both Fernandes and Cunha routinely occupy the same central lanes, congesting passing angles and simplifying the defensive task for opposition mid-blocks.

This structural overlap creates two major complications:

  1. Suppression of Buildup Dynamics: With multiple central figures dropping deep simultaneously to demand the ball, United loses vertical depth, allowing opposition backlines to step up and compress the playing field.
  2. Rest-Defense Compromise: When possession is lost in Zone 14, both primary playmakers are often stranded ahead of the ball, leaving the central midfield double-pivot completely exposed to counter-attacking transitions.

3.2 Recruitment Inefficiencies and Midfield Subversion

The squad's ongoing struggles underscore a profound dysfunction within Manchester United’s recruitment infrastructure. Rather than recruiting players to satisfy specific functional requirements within an established game model, the club has repeatedly signed high-cost individuals whose skill sets do not mesh with the physical and technical demands of Premier League midfield control.

The evaluation of recent signings highlights this imbalance. Manuel Ugarte was acquired to provide defensive security and central duel winning. However, his technical limitations under pressure hinder United’s ability to build cleanly from the back against high-pressing teams. Similarly, Joshua Zirkzee and André Santos have struggled to adapt to the speed and tactical discipline required at the highest level. Santos, in particular, suffered in early appearances where his midfield control was eclipsed by opposition players acquired for a fraction of his transfer fee, such as Pascal Gross and Regan Slater.

This dynamic exposes a broader industry lesson: market value does not guarantee tactical efficacy. When a club lacks a coherent tactical framework, expensive talent frequently underperforms relative to well-coached, highly structured opponents operating within clear operational roles.

3.3 The Analytics Paradox: The 50 Long Shots Aberration

One of the most striking statistical metrics analyzed by the panel is Manchester United’s league-leading total of 50 shots from outside the penalty area across their opening five fixtures. To contextualize this figure, control-oriented sides like Manchester City registered only 16 long-range efforts over the same period. While superficial evaluations might misinterpret high shot counts as evidence of attacking ambition, advanced analytics reveal a far more concerning reality.

In modern football analytics, shots taken from 25 yards out represent low Expected Goals (xG) probability events, typically averaging between 0.01 and 0.04 xG per attempt. Elite possession teams actively restrict low-probability attempts, preferring to cycle possession until high-probability opportunities—such as penalty-area cutbacks or central box penetrations—can be created.

An extraordinary volume of long-range shooting is rarely a sign of tactical strength; it is almost universally the hallmark of offensive frustration, poor positional structure, and an inability to break down settled defensive lines.

When United’s possession sequences stall around the opposition penalty arc, players like Fernandes and Cunha routinely resort to low-probability potshots. This reliance on distance shooting highlights a failure in positional coaching: the team lacks the automated movement patterns, third-man runs, and wing-overloads required to unlock compact low blocks cleanly.

3.4 In-Game Management, Passive Low Blocks, and Substitution Delays

The panel’s evaluation of Michael Carrick’s touchline management reveals a troubling transition from reactive caretaker success to full-time structural hesitation. During his initial stint, Carrick excelled at formulating specific match-day game plans to counter individual opponents. However, managing a elite club over a full campaign requires proactive tactical adjustments and decisive in-game interventions.

In matches against aggressive, well-coached teams like Fulham and Brighton, United exhibited severe structural passivity during out-of-possession phases. Rather than establishing a coherent mid-block press with clear triggers, the team repeatedly retreated into a passive low block. Without aggressive pressure on the ball, opposition midfielders were granted time to pick passes between United's defensive lines.

Furthermore, Carrick’s reactive substitution timing has compounded on-pitch issues. In high-tempo contests such as the Manchester Derby, where obvious tactical adjustments were required at halftime to capitalize on structural advantages, key personnel changes—such as introducing Benjamin Sesco—were delayed until deep into the second half. This hesitation allows opponents to adjust their shapes first, surrendering the tactical initiative.

3.5 Eight Years of Ideological Drift: Governance and Club Architecture

The root cause of Manchester United’s recurrent crises does not lie primarily on the training pitch, but within executive governance. Over the past eight years, the club’s sporting leadership has failed to define a clear operational philosophy. Modern football governance dictates that a club's Sporting Director and Technical Board must establish an overarching football identity—determining everything from academy tactical principles to data-recruitment profiles.

At Old Trafford, managerial appointments have driven strategy, rather than strategy driving managerial appointments. By continually hiring managers with conflicting footballing ideologies, the club has accumulated a fragmented squad. When a new manager arrives, they inherit a squad where half the players are functionally unsuited to their preferred methods, prompting another cycle of expensive squad overhauls and financial write-downs.

3.6 Modern Tactical Trends vs. Traditional Tactical Pragmatism

The contrast between Manchester United and the Premier League’s elite highlights a wider evolution in modern tactics. Premier League football in 2026 demands complete structural integration. The top sides operate with high tactical automation: central defenders split to specific angles, inverted full-backs form temporary double-pivots to control transition channels, and wingers maintain maximum width to open central spaces.

United’s reliance on traditional pragmatism and individual moments of genius stands in stark contrast to this automated approach. When tactical structures break down, relying on individual brilliance produces erratic results. Against lower-tier opposition, talent alone can secure points; against organized, tactically sophisticated sides, the absence of automated collective structures leads to comprehensive systemic failure.

4. Speaker Perspectives & Analytical Contrast

The discussion between Lawrence Osler, Miguel Delaney, and Richard Jolly offers a fascinating multi-dimensional critique of Manchester United’s operational state. While all three analysts agree that the club is performing far below its historic standards, their analytical frameworks and diagnostic emphases diverge in illuminating ways.

Analyst Primary Diagnostic Focus Methodological Approach Key Analytical Conclusion
Miguel Delaney Institutional Architecture & Governance Macro-historical, structural club analysis United suffers from long-term ideological drift; the reliance on Bruno Fernandes masks a fundamental absence of coaching identity.
Richard Jolly Squad Construction & Pitch Execution Micro-tactical, recruitment efficiency, player profiles High-cost summer acquisitions (Ugarte, Zirkzee, Santos) represent severe recruitment mismatches; fixture difficulty threatens further collapse.
Lawrence Osler Advanced Data & Metric Reconciliation Statistical analytics, game-state evaluation Underlying stats (xG, touches in box) suggest potential upside, but excessive low-probability long shots signal structural desperation.

Miguel Delaney approaches the crisis through an institutional lens. He emphasizes that Manchester United’s central problem is the absence of an overarching identity. Delaney points out that for nearly a decade, the team's identity has essentially been reduced to the individual playmaking of Bruno Fernandes. In Delaney’s view, this dependency reflects a macro-level failure of club leadership to establish a sustainable, modern coaching culture that outlasts individual player legacies.

Richard Jolly provides a sharp, micro-level critique focused on recruitment efficiency and pitch-level mechanics. Jolly focuses heavily on player profiling, arguing that summer acquisitions like Manuel Ugarte, Joshua Zirkzee, and André Santos represent major valuation mismatches. His analysis underscores the contrast between high transfer fees and poor functional output, highlighting how lower-cost opposition midfielders routinely outplay United's central engine. Furthermore, Jolly highlights the immediate threat posed by the club's upcoming fixture list, warning that a series of tough away games could push the current crisis to breaking point.

Lawrence Osler acts as the analytical moderator, examining the tension between raw statistical data and observable performance defects. Osler points to positive underlying indicators—such as expected goals, touches in the opposition box, and total shots—to question whether United’s start is partially a statistical anomaly destined for mean reversion. However, he reconciles this by analyzing shot-quality distribution, agreeing with Delaney and Jolly that high shot volume driven by speculative 25-yard efforts reflects structural breakdown rather than dominant attacking play.

5. Strategic & Industry Implications

The systemic issues troubling Manchester United offer important strategic lessons for the broader sports management and football business industry. In an era dominated by multi-club ownership models, sovereign wealth investments, and sophisticated data analytics, traditional brand prestige and immense revenue generation no longer guarantee domestic or continental success.

Several key industry trends emerge from United's ongoing crisis:

1. The Demise of Brand-Driven Recruitment: Historically, elite clubs could compensate for organizational inefficiency by simply outbidding rivals for high-profile talent. In contemporary football, financial fair play regulations and squad cost rules make inefficient capital expenditure highly damaging. Accumulating high-wage, unaligned assets restricts future maneuvering, leaving clubs burdened with illiquid player contracts that cannot be moved.

2. The Necessity of Top-Down Tactical Alignment: Successful modern clubs—such as Brighton, Brentford, and Arsenal—demonstrate that long-term competitive advantage relies on structural continuity. The Sporting Director, analytics department, and coaching staff must operate under a single, unified game model. When a manager departs, his replacement must share compatible tactical principles, ensuring that squad development remains on a linear path.

3. The Financial Risk of Champions League Absence: Prolonged domestic mediocrity carries compounding economic consequences. Failing to secure consistent Champions League qualification damages commercial growth, reduces match-day revenue, and undermines a club's appeal to top-tier talent. For a commercial giant like Manchester United, sustained failure on the pitch threatens the very financial engine that powers the institution.

6. Looking Ahead: Unresolved Questions & Next Milestones

As Manchester United navigates this precarious season, executive leadership and the coaching staff face immediate, existential decisions. Michael Carrick's long-term viability as manager will not be determined by pragmatic press conferences or appealing to underlying statistical anomalies, but by his ability to establish structural discipline and deliver consistent results on the pitch.

To evaluate whether Manchester United can break out of its permacrisis, analysts and club executives must monitor several critical performance metrics and operational milestones over the coming months:

  • Shot-Quality Optimization: Will United reduce their reliance on speculative 25-yard efforts and improve their high-probability box entries? A meaningful increase in xG per shot will serve as the primary indicator of improved offensive coaching.
  • Zone 14 Positional Discipline: Can Carrick establish clear spatial boundaries between Bruno Fernandes and Matheus Cunha, preventing central congestion and restoring rest-defense stability?
  • Midfield Profile Integration: Will summer acquisitions like Manuel Ugarte and André Santos develop the technical composure needed to resist opposition pressing, or will United be forced into further market overhauls?
  • The Upcoming Fixture Gauntlet: How will the squad perform during an intense series of matches against Tottenham Hotspur, Atletico Madrid, Leeds United, and Como? Failing to secure positive results across this stretch could force executive leadership into another mid-season managerial decision.
  • Executive Governance Blueprint: Will the club's sporting hierarchy finally articulate and enforce a binding football identity that dictates all future recruitment and managerial choices?

Manchester United stands at a critical crossroads. Continuing with short-term tactical fixes and unaligned recruitment will only prolong the cycle of stagnation. Only a comprehensive, top-down commitment to structural identity, data-led squad building, and modern positional coaching can restore Old Trafford to the summit of English and European football.

💬 Key Quotes & Speaker Breakdown

Manchester United recruitment

"In my 20 years covering games at Old Trafford, the worst midfielder I've seen is Manuel Ugarte, and the worst striker I've seen is Joshua Zirkzee."

Richard Jolly

"The one signing this summer that really stands out is André Santos, who has only started two games. In his first game, he lost the midfield to Regan Slater, who cost 50 pounds, and in the second, he lost it to Pascal Gross, who cost 1.7 million."

Richard Jolly

Manchester United identity

"The identity of Manchester United in the last few years is essentially just Bruno Fernandes. I don't think of a style of player, I just think of Bruno Fernandes' assists."

Miguel Delaney

Premier League fixture difficulty

"United have a very difficult run of fixtures until the next international break. They have Tottenham, then a hat-trick of away games at Atletico Madrid, Leeds, and Como. You think they could lose all of those."

Richard Jolly

Manchester United tactics

"One of the issues with Matheus Cunha, and this is not Michael Carrick's fault, but it is Ruben Amorim's fault, is that they signed a man who wants to play in the position Bruno Fernandes wants to play in."

Richard Jolly

"Manchester United have taken 50 long shots this season, the most in the league. To me, that feels like a failure of coaching."

Miguel Delaney

Michael Carrick management

"I've never heard Michael Carrick talked about in the same way as Mikel Arteta. There was excitement about his first season at Middlesbrough, but that didn't translate to long-term results."

Miguel Delaney

Manchester United club structure

"It feels like eight years on, United still haven't decided on their ideology. They've gone from one style of coach to a completely different style of coach."

Miguel Delaney
📜 View Full Episode Verbatim Transcript 53,040 characters
Hello, welcome to Copper Independent, the Independence Football Podcast. I'm Lawrence Osler and I'm joined by Chief Football writer Miguel Delaney Heimigz. Hello. And Senior Football Correspondent Richard Jolly, Hi Rich. Hi yep. Today we are going to be talking about Manchester United, a club seemingly in a permanent state of despair, if not crisis. We'll discuss what's gone on so far this season where the Michael Carrick is the right man for the job and how on earth the club gets back to challenging for the Premier League and Champions League. And Miguel, you were at Craven Cottage this weekend, full of one Manchester United one. I mean firstly, let's start there, it's five games into the season, United have five points. It's still a long way to go. On the highlights from what I watched, they created some chances, they hit to the woodwork, but Lenna made some good saves, they didn't look terrible. Yet Gary Neville, I saw, could describe the start of the second half as the worst 50 minutes he's ever seen. So are we all over reacting or were United really that bad to watch in the flesh? Maybe not quite that bad, but it just wasn't good, I'd say. And like even the highlights kind of came out of a, I'd say the most of them came out of a first half, which is extremely end to end, given how aggressive full of my eye. And also once United went behind and I think this has been a relevant team, I touched in this and kind of two pieces I did myself where it's as if they need the urgency to actually have a kind of a shape to their attacking. As regards Neville's point, I suppose I get kind of Gary's broad point to weird it, I must say, because as that was happening, people were messaging me saying, like Neville's going really strong here. And I was going to think of the myself, I actually disagreed because that 50 minutes I have to say was one of the most logical things about the game, because full of more arguably the most aggressive team in the Premier League right now in terms of how they attack. And I think what Karak was clearly doing after half time, after what had been a back and forth first half was, and these are going to come at us, let's sit deep, catch some on the break. And they did threaten to do that a few times, they just got caught out, and then as opposed to the whole plan was unraveled by the nature of the goal they conceded. And to be fair, actually, you could say that goal sort of came from the passivity that Neville described, especially to Acunia, lost the ball in the middle, just kind of a general kind of like a daisicle nature of the way they were playing. But I did think that actually tactically made sense. I think ironically, I think that feeds in to kind of one of the bigger concerns, but you know, I think it's something that is a bit of a follow on from last season. So I've done two pieces in this with like a lot of concerns about how they attack, what feels like a shape, structure on it, and I think like, I'd be curious, like Rich went to so many more of their games last season, especially the home ones. But my sense is, Carrick is a very good manager, very good coach for planning for individual games. Hence they won a lot of those one-off matches last season, with a lot of kind of like almost specific strategic moves, they use this kind of decoy rule. His first game of this, his first game at Man in Ice, obviously, was that the Derby, exactly that, right? Yeah. Exactly, exactly. Yeah. And when I use these kind of decoy rules to spring off side traps, but once you don't want to, it's difficult to do again because people are wise to it. And secondly, I suppose in the same way as the difference between the pressure of being a caretaker and the pressure of being a full-time manager, there's difference between adapting to individual games and actually building a wider idea. And I think that is where the concern lies for me about Carrick. I wouldn't be going completely over the top yet. Look, we might have been right in it now if, as in the media, we the media might have been right in it. If they'd lost like I am against full-time, but it is a bit of a chaotic season as well. I think the issue isn't so much either the performance or the result against full-time in itself, because whilst both are a bit underwhelming, they're not disastrous. But I've been every other United game this season, and in their first six games, they were atrocious in three of them. They were atrocious at Hull, they were atrocious in the Manchester Derby, and they were atrocious at Brighton. And you could argue they were atrocious in different ways. You know, Hull, they just didn't seem ready for the start of the season at all. The Manchester Derby there had no idea how to play against ten men. Brighton, they had a two-year lead after ten minutes, and then it just felt apparent they were going to lose that game. A half-time, the number of people who were saying Brighton are going to win this three-two, and they did, I mean, and going back to what Miguel's sort of talking about with Michael Carrick, it's quite interesting in that when he came in, his decision-making often felt really good. And I did wonder if part of that was that because he's got a season ticket there, he'd spent months watching Rubin Amerin pick the wrong team in the wrong formation. And so he was sitting there in his seat thinking, if I was in charge, I'd play a 4-2-3-1, I'd play Bruno Fernandez as a number ten, I'd play Luke Sure as a left-back, I'd put Koby Minor in the midfield, I'd play this one in this position, this one in that position. But he also got his sub-s right a lot last season. If you look last season, Cesco is a very effective substitute scored quite a lot of goals. This season, one of the worrying elements is that the starting eleven has often looked wrong. The substitutions Carrick has been too slow to react, and I think he's probably quite annoyed by the use of the word passive, which his laid back demeanor lends itself to, and isn't necessarily fair. But the number of times a united sub has come so much later than it should, and the Manchester Derby was a case in point, because at half time, even before half time, everyone thought he needs to bring Cesco on, doesn't come on until sixty-seven minutes. So I think it's kind of the full, as I say, the full-um game you have to treat it in the context of what happened before then. I think Carrick was quite defensive of himself, and he wrote about this Miguel. He tried to put on a positive front and pulled some of the, he pointed to some of the unlucky things that have happened, obviously the early Harlan goal being perhaps the most prominent one over the first few games, and actually had a dig through the stats, and there are a lot of positive stats from an united, although it's only five games, they're taking the most shots, most shots in the box, they're third for expected goals, they're expected goal differences fourth, and a bit of that is game state, I guess they're falling behind their chasing games, they're trying to create chances, they're first for touches in the box. So I mean, is there any sort of sense that this is a bit of a blip in if you take the broader form from last season, they qualify for the Champions League, they played quite well for large chunks under Carrick, or are we at a point now where we're perhaps just seeing what the real Michael Carrick team is, I mean, do those stats perhaps suggest that there's an upturn waiting to happen? I'm not sure I go that far, but I must say, for me, it's caused for still an element of weight and sea, as I say, I might have been very different than they lost against full of issues, because I do, you know, three weeks of dwelling on all this now, and that goal did a verdict, but I mean, I mean, even the kind of the stats on shots say, but you can see the amount of shots they were taking on Sunday, and so much of it fails kind of, there was an element of just hopefulness about it, right? Well, I mean, there's a stat on that too, right, which is just on that point, they've taken the most long shots of any team in the league, they've taken 50, and the next closest is nothing and forest on 34, man City of only taking 16 shots from outside the box. So there's clearly, I think Bruno's taken 11, Kunius taken 7, he was taken loads of the pot shots, wasn't he? Obviously, one of them did come off, but I do like that to me feels like a failure of coaching, isn't it? Like that? Well, you can instruct that out of a team, surely. The one thing I would say on that, maybe, and this is what, because a lot of what Karak has been doing, has sort of, they're not kind of against kind of general, kind of tactical coaching norms, but he, like, as far as his own path a little bit, and obviously one of the big directives in the Premier League of the, like one of the big tactical directives from coaches has been, basically, from a world that has been kind of dominated by analytics and the metadata clubs now have, it's been that long shots are actually low chance. So let's try and keep the ball and work something closer. This is almost one of Pep Guardiola's biggest influences, and the amount of time is that City team scored the kind of classic five or so ago, the cut back and finish. And a little bit like maybe throw-ins two years ago, I do wonder whether Karak is kind of thinking, is this something actually that is, something that can be tactically exploited because so few teams are doing it, and we can do, and obviously, like, Brighton beat Arsenal at the weekend with two long shots, and that a team that, against the team, allows so little in their own area. There may be an element of that, although, I think there is an element that I don't must say if I was kind of like, he pushed on it, but also, that can be true at the same time, it can be true that some of it is coming from desperation, because my sense, especially towards the end of that full-arm game, was just, it was if kind of just three things were happening all the time. You know, I'm trying to build up, view kind of passing moves, but it all felt instinctive rather than actual kind of core to the, you know, choreographed core ination, and the way we kind of associate with elite teams now, and kind of these, you know, very off the core, little touches from him way more to try and open up a space, but then kind of full-arm, we're just well structured, which hasn't something, isn't something you can always say before in this season. The ball would be kind of circulated around, and it would end up in mostly a hopeless cross, and like, oh, look, that's a bigger issue we can get onto as regards personnel, and or else, a hopeful long shot, that kind of, well, it didn't do much until eventually, maybe for the first time this season, outside that win over Ripswitch, Carrick felt something went his way. In terms of the long shots, I mean, the, the couple of points, one is that Cunia and Fernandez are the sorts of players who would take a lot of long shots anyway, and when people looked at Cunia's stats at wolves, that was very notable about him. I mean, as Miguel says, maybe there will be this trend back towards it in Unai Emery's Aston Villa last year, scored a lot of goals from outside the box, and there's an element of which everyone says, this can't continue, these are low XG shots soon, relatively average out. If you have players who are very good at shooting from 25 yards, there is a logic to giving them more license to do so than people who are not, but in terms of your question, Lawrence, is there going to be an upturn? Look at United's fix, she list. Apart from the Manchester Derby, they had what looked a very nice start to the season. Even within that, they had some things that made you think, this is a good time to play this team. They had ever seen a few days after the Balagun deal broke down, and when there was a lot of unhappiness, they're full of them when they still haven't won a game under their new manager. They had the nicest possible Champions League game, you know, Sabar are probably the rank outside as of the 36. Then you look at who they've got until the next international break. I mean, that is a very, very different fix to list. I mean, they've got Tottenham first, which is very much the resistible force versus the movable object game. But then they've got the hat trick of away games of Athletica Madrid, Leeds and Como. You think what they could lose all of those? Not long after that, they've got Chelsea, they've got Ashton Villa in the last game before the break by which time this new MRE team might well already be jelling. And they've also got things which are looking their crypt tonight in a sort of ironic way. The team who couldn't play with a back three under Ruben Amorim can't play against a back three now. Jessica, we're playing a back three at the moment, Leeds are playing a back three, Chelsea are playing a back three. So that period of games, that next block of seven or eight, looks a lot harder than this first block of seven. Then what on earth do you know what to do with it? Let's say that, you go to that run of, like you said, Athletica Leeds, Como and United lose two or three of those games and the pressure builds and we're talking about them. We're recording another podcast. The articles are coming, the fans are, you know, booing full-time whistles. Do you get rid of Carrick and start again? And I think this maybe gets to the crux of Man United which is, it's not a club that has built its recruitment for example, around a playing style. It's a club that for a long time has just bought players for a manager and change managers and change styles. And that has been for me one of the key problems that Manchester United over the past five or six or seven years. It doesn't seem to be a consistency to that thinking. So where on earth are they going next? There isn't a clear sort of manager out there, like that I can think of at the top of my head. But yeah, I mean, where do you go? What do you do? Or do you say to Carrick? Do you know what? We've embedded you, we've given coaching stuff, you've got Steve Holland, we've built our recruitment now to in a place where it's a little bit more sensible, even if it's not amazing. It seems less scattergun than it used to be. Do we commit to this plan, what, you know, and ignore short-term results? Well, I just, I mean, in terms of short-term results, I suppose that's what I, when you were going through the stats there, Richard kind of touched on what it was reaching for, which is maybe the status somewhat explained by what are forgiving fixtures, given where United were at the end of the last season, they did those are games they should be dominating in that way that should be producing those stats. And like, let's see how it pans out now over the next few games, especially given how it looks like United, more than a lot of, you know, wealthier clubs, adapt to kind of individual games or seek to rather than kind of impose a certain approach on it. But even that oldest talk of approach, ideology, I suppose we're coming back to kind of the core of the discussion, exactly what you're getting at as well, Lawrence, and that, it's about who United have got, what they could have got. There was a lot of talk around United earlier this year, but how they see themselves where Arsenal were in 2019, which was, you know, left to deal with like years of dysfunction that were still linked to kind of trying to repair, but that almost being possible for kind of this great figure going. And there's an obvious hangover. They've had to kind of adapt to kind of some of the overpaying that the previous hierarchies the club had committed to the wages, they've had to kind of, so that has left them in difficulty now as regards to recruitment. You do just wonder though, given all the talk of the comparisons to Arsenal at that point, was caric scene as their old Artera figure, especially given its own history at the club, which actually is more pronounced that United than Artera's was an Arsenal. But the concern I would have had there even last season, and everyone's got a lot of better kind of parallels with SoulShare in multiple ways, right down to the switch from caretaker to permanent, like when I spoke, when I was speaking to people in football around 2018, 2019, when Artera first got the Arsenal job, or sorry, was first actually looking, being looked after the Arsenal job in 2018, it didn't get into a year and a half later. People were talking about it very excitedly because of how intense he was, how the idea easy had. It wasn't just about being quite all-existent, and while people might say that is easy to say now that it is a water league, I was saying it and getting a lot of heat on social media about it in 2020 and 2021, when Artera said, we're not so good. But while there's a respect for caric, I've never heard about them talked about in the same way. There was a little bit of excitement, wasn't there the first season in Middlesbrough, I'm ever going to say that? Yeah, they played some really nice stuff, and you could see how well coach they were and they were very attacking. But that didn't really translate so long-term results to it, and they ended up going backwards. Exactly. But we are still, and this is why I'm hasty to go too far. Sorry. Because exactly that, we don't have much of a body of proof really, we don't have much of a body of evidence to look at it. We're in a little bit like the whole Premier League season with so many other clubs. There are a lot of unknowns about this, including Manchester United. But my instinct is probably rich. I think there's a lot of concerns of from the first few games, and that was the thing about that second half against Fulham, even separate to what Gary Neville was saying in television. You could feel that familiar sense of crisis of building, and exactly what you're getting about, the conversation that we could well be having by the end of October. But then the other side of that is, I mean, look, we could get into the usual discussion here, but all the Manchester United decisions over a decade. But in contrast to 2016, when they hired Marina, or Marina was kind of the most bigest available name on the market, who wasn't Pec Wadiola, or typically for United that period, they said they appointed Marina at the wrong time, and just when he was under decline. But if you compare us again, there's actually very few guarantees as regards coaches right now, and even look at the Premier League right now. So many are basically kind of, except they're not quite going on ponds because the whole point of Premier League now is the influence of the coach has been diluted a bit because the structure is around them. Whereas have United failed to do that, I suppose, is perhaps the question, are they still quite reliant? Have they not built those structures yet solidly enough to just be able to hire a different coach, who's also quite promising, and they slot in, and, you know, the at-light Brighton can do, for example. But it is not a big, I do think they have made some of those steps. Recruitment is better even though, like, a rich can discuss this more, I've said, I would have some questions about, say, trying to resolve the team in blocks, because just for you, I think we've mentioned this in the previous part, certainly what, you finally get around to your defence, and you've got to maybe fix your attack again, except in which has been raised the course. But I think they're getting those steps right, but what are the big issues that United over the past decade as well, say, is that they didn't just go from coach to coach, they went from archetype to archetype, and that's not what, like, just because one specific choice of coach within an archetype was wrong, it doesn't mean that the idea is wrong, so similarly, like, if they were, eventually, we're getting ahead of ourselves here, there should be some United fans screaming at us, I'm sure, but if they were, who eventually get really carried, it doesn't mean that that sort of idea is misplaced. The general rule of recent Manchester United managers is that they're always the opposite to the bloke who went before, which doesn't really point to sort of structure and someone who could slot straight in, but in terms of recruitment, I mean, they like to say recruitment is better. I'm not convinced. I mean, for starters, I think covering games at old traffic for 20 years. In that time, and excluding kids who only made a handful of appearances, I think the worst midfielder I've seen is Manuel Agate, and the worst striker I've seen is Joshua Zerkecy, and they were signed at the start of the Radcliffe regime. Miguel also talked about the blocks of signings, the three forwards, the three midfielders. The three forwards could be called qualified successes last season. They all got double figures for Premier League goals, United finish third. I think they probably paid over the odds for them all a bit. That's not a disaster if you pay over the odds for the right player, but there are issues with all three. One of the issues I always feel with Matthias Cunier, and this is not Michael Carrick's fault at all, but is Ruben Amarim's fault, is that they signed a man who wants to play in the position Bruno Fernandez wants to play in. And that was because Amarim was playing Fernandez in the wrong position. Carrick comes in and plays Fernandez in the right position, there is no real perfect role for Cunier in that team. The start of this season, Cunier is playing centre-forward, despite a remarkable aversion to getting into the penalty area. And I think he's probably United's fourth best centre-forward in their current squad, after Cesco and Boimone Rashford. Cesco is an interesting one because either Carrick doesn't trust Cesco's body, or he can't really see his side with that conventional laminide. And I can't work out which one it is because Carrick will always play Cesco. And also they play so many crosses into the box for a notional Cesco style player. Yeah. And then when he comes on at Everton, they put a cross into the box and he heads it in. And you think, well, that's why he should have been on the pitch all along. And then the one this summer that really stands out is André Santos, who he's only started two games. And there is a precedent for players starting the United Careers Badling going on to have good careers and go about 20 years and village and everywhere a case is in point. But André Santos seemed a panic by when Edison had issues in his medical. The two games he started, people say United couldn't afford an Elliot Anderson $116 million. That's true. They spent $48 million on Santos. In his first game, he lost the midfield to Regan Slater, who cost $50, and in the second game, he lost the midfield to Pascal Gross, who cost Brighton $1.7 million. So at the moment, it feels that United have got the worst of both worlds there and that they've paid a sizeable fee for a player who's losing out to people who cost a fraction of it. And so far, in all the other games, it's been Kobe Minor and Yuri Telemann's there. So I'm not sure they have got the recruitment that much better. Would Sandhouse well, I just wanted to know, like given Chelsea are short in midfield. And they let this midfield go, this even before, the Anzo Fernandez situation was anything close to resolved. Is that should have maybe raised some concerns? I think that the stroke best example of that is Tottenham, when they bought Jan Paul Van Hecker from Brighton and sold Vuskevich. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Are you sure this is a good deal with the best recruitment team in the Premier League? Like, do you want to think about this? Oh, and Vuskevich is fantastic. I don't know. All the asses, remember here and all this sort of stuff, like that Vuskevich is one of the most promising defenders in Europe. And then Tottenham, let them go. It's incredible. But one thing on the attack in as well, Rich said there about Bruno and where he's playing. So I had coaches at more than one club saying to me last year that they realized we united that you stop Bruno and you stop united. But it was very difficult to do because the forum he was on, where he was playing, as Rich says, where Karak has put him. But now, if he was like, they've sort of stopped them themselves, because I mean, one of the things that was more so the Manchester City game than at the weekend, to be fair. But suddenly Bruno is a lot further back in the pitch. He's not affecting games in the same way. I remember just noticing once or twice that kind of almost, it's almost as classic a Bruno moment as him scoring, you know, coming up with a big moment, which was he played a bar for from quite deep in his, quite deep in the pitch, like inside United's half of the center circle. And then he'd be moning at someone in front of him. And that, that seemed to happen a lot. With Bruno, that he can't, there are times when he actually can be quite a good quarterback because some games I remember playing there under Eric Tenhark. So, and playing those passes from deep and it can work now and again. But the thing is with Bruno as well is that if you look at some of the bad games recently, the one moment has come from him. The Manchester Derby later on, it was him who provided the passer and Waymo, the Brighting game where United basically had one chance after the tenth minute, it was Bruno releasing Marcus Rashford, which kind of backs up Miguel's point that if you stop Bruno, those chances don't happen at all. Which does raise the question of what the rest of them are actually doing, to which I don't have a particularly good answer at times. To sort of play that was advocate and defend the recruitment slightly, we talked about Ugarte and Zerksy, who I completely agree, particularly Zerksy just never should have been inside his record, wasn't good enough to sign for Manchester United before he joined. But I guess is the difference now, which is not saying much, but they aren't the sort of Anthony Price's or San Joe Price's. So when that disastrous or wages, so when that disastrous transfer happens, at least now, Man United seemed to be in a position where they're not absolutely blowing themselves into a position, which has happened now, where the shack was kind of on in terms of PSR and having to fix previous mistakes. If Ugarte and Zerksy can be moved on, then they can sort of forget about it. But they can't move them on, that's the problem, you know, for all the stuff in the summer of Way, United being outspent, one of the reason is because they can't sell anyone. If United have been able in the summer to sell Ugarte and Zerksy and Anana for, say, 30 million each, that's a 90 million boost to the kitty give or take. Now, obviously, Ugarte gets injured at the World Cup, but in reality, they probably wouldn't have been able to sell him anyway. I mean, you're right in terms of they're not paying Anthony Price's, but Anthony is the single worst signing in their history. So if that's the bar you're putting him up against, I thought that I suppose there are other signs, I mean, that there's some pattern to prove and primarily tell him when you look at him, when you talk about paying a little bit over the odds and you're right, but I guess they're factoring that in when you get someone like him, when he's going to score 15 goals straight away and Kunya and Telemann again, I guess, falls into that category. Like, is there a sense that maybe there's some coherent thought to what they're doing? I mean, I personally would have sort of think that the best thing they should have done is given Dan Ashworth the keys to the club and said, you've got 10 years to rebuild this club. And they've gone with the sort of Barada Wilcox. And now it's Christopher Bevelle as it is the head of recruitment, but it feels like there's some semblance of clear thinking, even if it might not be proving, providing immediate relief and success on the pitch, or do you think that's generous? I think that's generous. I mean, one of the things that people in football were saying was that was a classic of this modern night and that was a bit of a, there was actually a lack of clarity in that Ashworth is renowned in the, in the game as a structure builder, as kind of like someone who puts in place a model for a team or a, where I didn't know he's back at the F.A., a federation or a club. And that was actually what you know, they were crying out for before appointing Dan Ashworth. And then certainly he was in there kind of like, you know, in terms of if it, what felt at least externally as a kind of quasi-recruitment role, which Bevelle is now feeling and people do talk very highly about Bevelle, although as Richard said, I'm really being quite strong about already, you know, let's see how some of these choices go. One of the things with Ashworth as well, I remember someone at a different club saying to me, there's two types of director of football. And Ashworth's the kind of collegiate one who brings together all departments and, you know, can work with the academy, can work with the women's team, can work with the recruitment team and all the rest of it. And then there's your pure recruitment director of football, which, you know, Michael Edwards was then a name that was mentioned in that context. And so it's interesting if, to go with what Miguel says, you know, I think we're hiring Dan Ashworth to be Michael Edwards, not to be Dan Ashworth. But the way it was was, it was obviously kind of, you had talked about around, they, well, the talk is they did want them, but he was only willing to go back to football for a specific role, which did briefly for Liverpool, but is now left again. Yeah, the head of a multi club operation that only had one club. Yes. But I mean, Miguel, you talked about just stopping Man United is basically stopping Bruno Fernandez. I mean, I sort of think when we talk about the club having an identity, and I don't know if either of you can really ascertain what that identity is or what it is supposed to be, the identity to me feels like it is essentially just Bruno Fernandez. Like, when I think of Man United in the last few years, I just think of him. I don't think of a style of player. I don't think of a type of profile of player. I just think of Bruno Fernandez as assists. And I do wonder if there is any sense that something is building. Like I said, there was a sort of a coherent plan in terms of players that they're buying, but it's not a profile of player. Like Bournemouth will always buy athletic players, for example. And they just stick to that and they stick to that and they ignore the results and they stick to it. And Man United, I don't feel have that underlying idea, do they? This is the kind of maddest thing of all, isn't it? I remember being told, at the peak of United's problems in the first post-Fergus and era, when, obviously, Marie and yours under decline, and we're talking to some of the people at the hierarchy a bit. I remember speaking to people in football, they were kind of going on like, one thing you have to do in this situation is basically, you first got to accept where you are as a club and it looks actually so much this is relevant to Tottenham Hotspur as well. Decide where you are as a club, double in history and where you want to go. And you know, accept where you are. But from that, also decide on your ideology and build everything. And yes, that ideology can be adapted, as Brighton did, as even City of Dawn, at the other end of it, that ideology can be adapted, but there's still principles there that everything fits into. And it still feels like eight years on, you know, I haven't really done that. I mean, even like, like Racklivers in some ways continued some of the problems of, sorry, the, I should say, the Innius led football leadership in some way, continued the problems that they had in previous regime as well. As Richard said, they've gone from kind of one style of coach to a completely different style of coach. And it's certainly the thing you think about Amor and now like, maybe his former Milan or, well, Milan or another discussion you could have comparable to United, but they have on a league title recently. But Amor and was sort of like, it was a good idea, just in completely the wrong situation. I disagree with that. I don't think Amor and is a good idea. In terms of the question, are they building towards anything? Look at the ages of the team. The best player they've had since Ferguson turned 32 recently. And this United is not a young team. And the Arsenal Parallel is quite interesting because 2019, yes, they had some older players and they tried to accelerate it by it with some more older players. The David Louise, William type signings, which didn't work. But they also had Buccaio Sacca, Gabriel Martin, early Emile Smith, row. This United team is quite old. And I will defend the signing of Yuri Telemans, but they've signed him at 29. They signed Kunia and Embuymo with sort of 26 or so. So you know, if you're saying you're building something for say five years in the future, you know, are they going to win the league with Kunia and Embuymo at 32 and Telemans at 34? Probably not. The defense obviously does, you know, has the most obvious aging issues and McGuire and Shaw, but also Diego Dallow, who at times this season has looked the oldest 27-year-old in the business. So, you know, if you are building something, what are they building? You know, who are they building around? Beliebers, Young, Santos, these young, Cesco's young, Senna lamens his young, and that's genuinely one that could be United Goldkeeper for 10, 12 years. So that's a good set. Diallo is probably the best of the lot, I would say, of that kind of young. At Ahmad Isis, but he kind of had a golden few months. But as I say, is there enough they're actually building around? Toby Mine is one they'll say they're building around, but do you decide to all that as well, Rich? I mean, all of these players, and this is, this is especially true in the modern game or any play you've got, basically, is that whatever they're all individual quality, they can be, in some cases quite drastically amplified, depending on kind of the tactical context they're in. But that, unfortunately, for United, that doesn't just mean what the manager is doing in that particular setup. It comes back to what we're talking about, actually, you have a team that is, that is everything around, that is shaped by the, an ideology. So the player is fitting in to a very specific role, and it doesn't, it doesn't feel like any of these, any of these signings you're making are fitting into a very specific role. In fact, I think you might correct me in this, Rich, but I think some of these signings have been made actually because of that very adaptability to almost avoid the kind of the problem they used to have of where we sign a player and this manager won't like them. And when I feel like that doesn't he way, he was like, oh, he could play them, you can play on the way. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think they will say that, but I mean, I remember when they saw in Zerksy they said, well, he can play as a nine and he can play as a ten, but he can't play well as either. Would it, would it, would it, would it, you're allowed, you're allowed, you're just kind of assigning it, doesn't work in that. 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