Tottenham are paying for the one coach who can make De Zerbi-ball work

The double identity of Tottenham Hotspur

Tottenham Hotspur is currently a club split between two incompatible worlds. In March, they were trading blows with Atlético Madrid in the Champions League Round of 16, a privilege earned by winning the Europa League the previous May. In May, they were fighting for their lives to stay in the Premier League, eventually finishing in 17th place.

This was their second consecutive season finishing in that exact position. The contrast is bizarre and embarrassing for a club of this stature. The instability that brought them here was self-inflicted from the top.

Ange Postecoglou was sacked in June 2025, immediately after lifting the Europa League trophy. Thomas Frank took over but lasted until February 2026, followed by Igor Tudor’s chaotic 44-day tenure. When Roberto De Zerbi arrived on March 31, 2026, he inherited a squad in freefall.

De Zerbi's debut was a disaster, ending in a 1-0 away defeat to Sunderland on April 12. That loss stretched Tottenham's run to a historically bad 14-match winless streak. The panic in North London was real.

The threat of relegation hovered over the Tottenham Hotspur Stadium like a toxic cloud. Safety was secured only by the narrowest of margins, confirmed on the final day, May 24, with a 1-0 victory over Everton. De Zerbi helped the club secure 11 points from their final six matches to clinch survival.

But that was survival football. It was pragmatic, tense, and far removed from the Italian’s tactical ideals. Now, in the pre-season of July 2026, the real work begins.

De Zerbi is overhauling the squad's style. To do this, he needs coaches who know his system inside out.

The mechanics of the Crofts appointment

This is where Andrew Crofts enters the picture. As reported in the Sky Sports transfer tracker, Crofts has left Brighton & Hove Albion to join Tottenham as Assistant Head Coach. The two clubs agreed on a compensation package to facilitate the move.

Crofts is not just a standard staff member. He is a tactician who bridges the gap between old and new styles. Crofts has a long history at Brighton.

He coached the U21s, served as interim boss when Graham Potter left in 2022, and worked directly under De Zerbi. He then remained on staff under Fabian Hürzeler. This makes him a unique asset.

He knows the exact mechanics of De Zerbi's training drills and knows how to translate them to Premier League players. His departure is a significant loss for Brighton, as confirmed in Brighton's recent staff changes. For Spurs, paying compensation for an assistant coach shows Daniel Levy is backing De Zerbi's project.

This is a massive shift. Levy is finally investing in the coaching staff required to build a long-term tactical philosophy. Crofts will serve as the bridge between De Zerbi’s Italian staff and the squad.

At Brighton, Crofts was the institutional memory. He managed the transition from Potter's flexible structures to De Zerbi's rigid positional play. He will need to perform the same miracle in North London, but under far greater pressure.

His double duty with the Welsh national team also adds a fascinating dimension. Working under Craig Bellamy, Crofts has been exposed to a high-intensity, vertical pressing style. This hybrid background could allow Crofts to introduce more defensive solidity into De Zerbi's framework.

Drilling the press bait

To understand why Crofts is necessary, one must look at how De Zerbi-ball actually operates on the training pitch. The system is notoriously rigid and difficult to learn. It requires absolute positional discipline.

The players must trust the structure even when opponents are sprinting at them. The build-up is the heart of the system. It starts with the goalkeeper, Guglielmo Vicario, and the two center-backs, Micky van de Ven and Kevin Danso.

De Zerbi wants his defenders to invite pressure. They will often stand with the sole of their foot on the ball. This is not showboating; it is a tactical trigger.

Tactical responsibilities in the deep build-up

• Guglielmo Vicario must act as the eleventh outfield player, inviting the press and playing short passes to the center-backs rather than clearing long.
• Micky van de Ven and Kevin Danso are tasked with holding their positions deep, using sole-of-the-foot pauses to draw the opposition's first line of pressure.
• The double-pivot midfielders must remain vertically aligned, offering short passing angles and looking to release the ball to the advanced midfielders with single-touch passes.

The spacing must be perfect. The distance between the center-backs and the double-pivot must be exactly ten to twelve yards. If the distance is too large, the pass is intercepted.

If it is too small, the press covers both players. This requires hours of repetitive drilling. Every angle, every body shape, and every touch must be automated.

We saw the danger of playing this style without proper training during De Zerbi's first game at Sunderland. In that match, Tottenham tried to build from the back but looked completely lost. Vicario was pressed into errors.

The team lost possession 18 times in their own defensive third. Sunderland’s winning goal came from a misplaced pass by Radu Drăgușin under pressure in the 64th minute. The fans were furious, and the tactical experiment looked like a disaster.

It was clear that the squad lacked the positional automation needed to execute these patterns under pressure.

The vertical transition

Once the press is baited, the transition must be rapid. The ball is played into the double-pivot, who must quickly lay it off to a third man. This third man is usually an attacking midfielder, like James Maddison or Lucas Bergvall, dropping into space.

The vertical pass must bypass the opponent’s midfield line in a single movement. From there, the ball is spread wide to the wingers. Or it is played directly to the forwards, Richarlison and Mathys Tel, who run into the space vacated by the pressing defenders.

This is the goal of the system. It creates artificial counter-attacks. You build slowly in your own box to attack at speed in the opponent’s half.

But this transition requires midfielders who can play with their back to goal. They must receive the ball under heavy pressure, turn, or play a one-touch pass. At Brighton, De Zerbi had Moises Caicedo and Alexis Mac Allister, who were masterclasses in this role.

Working under Hürzeler at Brighton during the early part of the season provided Crofts with another tactical layer. Hürzeler’s system relied on a fluid 3-1-6 attacking structure with aggressive counter-pressing. This experience will be vital at Tottenham, where the players have struggled with transition defense for years.

This defensive vulnerability makes the recovery pace of Micky van de Ven a cornerstone of the system. De Zerbi’s high line leaves a massive gulf of space behind the defensive line. Van de Ven's recovery sprints were the main reason Tottenham survived the late-season pressure, particularly during the tense final minutes against Everton.

The Palhinha paradox

At Tottenham, the current squad profiles present a major tactical mismatch. This brings us to the most critical tactical problem facing De Zerbi and Crofts. Let's look at João Palhinha.

He was the undisputed savior of Tottenham's relegation fight. He scored the winning goal in the 82nd minute against Wolves to break the winless run. He then scored the winner against Everton on the final day, striking in the 43rd minute to seal safety.

Palhinha is a fan favorite, and his defensive contributions are elite. He leads the league in tackles won and interceptions per ninety minutes. He is a defensive wall.

But he is not a De Zerbi midfielder. The contrast in styles is stark. In a De Zerbi build-up, the deep midfielders must be press-resistant.

They need high pass completion rates under pressure. At Fulham and Bayern, Palhinha was never asked to play this way. His progressive pass completion rate under pressure is just 68 percent.

He prefers to win the ball and recycle it safely to the side or go long. If De Zerbi forces Palhinha to receive the ball facing his own goal with a midfielder pressing his back, disasters will happen. We saw hints of this in the late-season games.

Palhinha looked uncomfortable when asked to take multiple touches in his own box. He turned the ball over in dangerous areas against Aston Villa and Chelsea. He is a destroyer, not a playmaker.

The midfield bottleneck

The rest of the midfield offers little relief. Conor Gallagher is a running machine. He excels in a high press, winning second balls and driving forward.

But like Palhinha, he lacks the technical security to play in tight spaces under pressure. His passing range is limited, and he is not a natural deep playmaker. Yves Bissouma has the dribbling ability to escape pressure.

He worked under De Zerbi at Brighton briefly, but his discipline remains a concern. He has a tendency to switch off defensively. Lucas Bergvall is highly talented but young and inexperienced.

Xavi Simons wants to play higher up the pitch, between the lines, where he can create. He cannot be dragged into the deep build-up without losing his attacking threat. This leaves De Zerbi with a difficult choice.

Does he abandon his tactical principles to suit the players he has? Or does he force them into a system that exposes their weaknesses? This is where Crofts' coaching will be tested to the limit.

He must design training sessions that accelerate the technical development of these midfielders. If Crofts cannot teach Palhinha and Gallagher how to receive and release the ball in tight spaces, the system will collapse. Tottenham will become predictable.

Opponents will simply block the passing lanes to Maddison and Simons, forcing the center-backs to go long. When that happens, De Zerbi-ball becomes nothing more than a slow suicide pact. The appointment of De Zerbi on a five-year contract was a statement of intent by Daniel Levy.

The Levy gamble

It was an admission that the pragmatic, short-term appointments of the past had failed. The consecutive 17th-place finishes were a wake-up call. The club needed a clear identity, a modern tactical philosophy that the fans could get behind.

But hiring De Zerbi and paying compensation for Crofts is only the first step. The squad must be rebuilt to match the manager's vision. If Levy does not back De Zerbi in the transfer market with press-resistant midfielders, the project is doomed before it starts.

The tactics are too demanding for a squad assembled for different styles. The pre-season matches will show us how far the players have come. The drills on the training pitch must translate into automatic movements on the field.

If they do, Tottenham could finally break out of their mid-table mediocrity. If they don't, the fans will quickly lose patience with the defensive turnovers and the risky passing in their own box. The pressure is on, and the clock is ticking.